

I am a Ph.D. Candidate in my sixth year at the University of California San Diego studying behavioral and experimental economics. My research uses laboratory experiments to examine how people make choices in controlled environments in order to understand how they think and make decisions in the world.
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My research interests generally involve asking about how people think about other people in strategic settings. I have projects studying how people form and update beliefs about cheating in games, how people bargain in the presence of strategic messaging, and whether or not people choose to paternalistically intervene in others' choices when they have better information than those others. I have also studied failures of probabilistic reasoning and have interests in strategic sophistication.
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In my free time, I like to play tennis, rock climb, and meet with friends for board games. I am also an avid poker player, escape room aficionado, and musical theater enthusiast.
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My CV is available here.
About Me
Works in Progress
Messaging in Bargaining: Which Signals Work?
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Abstract: Using a laboratory experiment, I examine how the presence of specific forms of strategic communication influences participants’ strategies and outcomes in ultimatum-style bargaining games. Despite theoretical predictions of babbling, subjects appear to treat messages as if they are credible, leading to substantial gains for subjects using messaging. I further characterize player types, and suggest that my data may be explained by a ”cheap talk with lying costs”-style model.
Paternalism: an Information Account
Working Paper Forthcoming
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Abstract: I consider the role of information quality about payoffs on an individual’s decision of whether to intervene in another person’s choice or not. In doing so, I estimate and compare an “information premium” - a measure of how much better information one needs in order to intervene, to examine conditions when people are more or less likely to do so. I suggest that stark differences in information premia pre- and post-signal realization indicate that contingent thinking plays a significant role in this exercise, and may likewise influence findings in other preference-elicitation exercises.
The Motivations and Consequences of Beliefs about Cheating
In Progress
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Abstract:: Using a repeated hide-and-seek game in which cheating is possible, I study how subjects update their beliefs about their opponents cheating, and how their choice to keep playing or exit the game varies with these beliefs. In particular, I consider the role of motivated reasoning and self-serving attribution bias as a driver of beliefs about cheating, and relate findings to the broader social sciences literature on conspiratorial thinking.
Research


I am the Lab Manager for the EconLab at UCSD, located in SSRB 165. I manage scheduling, recruitment, day to day operation, and support running experiments for faculty and graduate students engaged in in-person experimental research.
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To go to the EconLab website, click here.
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To become a subject, go the link above and click "request account." Most studies are available for UCSD students 18 years old and above.
Teaching
In addition to my research, I have been a Graduate Student Teaching Assistant in the following courses:
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Principles of Microeconomics
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Intermediate Microeconomics (A/B/C)
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Economics of the Environment
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Economics of Discrimination
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Industrial & Organizational Economics